

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director
FROM : Chief, Legislative Liaison Division.
SUBJECT: Testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee.

DATE: 28 April 1947.

The references to clandestine intelligence appear on pages 7, 9 and 11 of the text. They can be eliminated if you desire without harming the text.

If you desire to eliminate them, we can run a new stencil of the last half of the text this afternoon.

STAT

WALTER L. PFORZMAIER.

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(Sender ~~Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP90-00610R000100090014-3~~)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
INTER-OFFICE ROUTING SLIP
 (Revised 10 Sept 1946)

FROM	TO	INITIALS	DATE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE	<i>RH</i>	<i>W</i>	
EXECUTIVE TO THE DIRECTOR	←		
SECRETARY TO THE DIRECTOR			
EXECUTIVE OFFICE: ASST. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR			
ADVISORY COUNCIL			
EXECUTIVE FOR PERSONNEL & ADMINISTRATION			
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ASST. DIRECTOR, SPECIAL OPERATIONS			
ASST. DIRECTOR, RESEARCH & EVALUATION			
ASST. DIRECTOR, COLLECTION & DISSEMINATION			
CHIEF, SECURITY BRANCH			
✓ <i>Legislative Liaison</i>	✓		

STAT

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✓ RETURN

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STATEMENT BY
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JAMES FORRESTAL
BEFORE THE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON EXPENDITURES
IN EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS
APRIL 24, 1947

Ever since the beginning of discussions about the future form of our system of national security, I have argued that any legislation on this subject should take into account the character of our government and society, our geographical position on the globe, the necessity for exact knowledge regarding our natural and productive resources as the first step in our industrial mobilization planning, the danger of becoming frozen to any single concept of war, the relationship of military power to national policy, and finally, the imponderable factors of morale and service traditions, with particular reference to the Naval Service with its components of naval aviation and the Marine Corps.

The bill before you has been drawn with all of these considerations in mind.

I shall discuss each briefly.

First, our form of government and society:

The American military system must respond to our democratic -- or as some prefer to call it -- our representative-republican form of government. There is no place in our form of government for dictators -- military or civilian. American accomplishment in both peace and war is the product of cooperation and intelligent acceptance of self-imposed discipline. It is for that reason that the Navy from the outset of the discussions on unification opposed and continues to oppose, the concept of a single Chief of Staff. We have believed in the continuation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with an executive organization that will insure that necessary decisions will be made and made promptly. There is no inherent fault in the conduct of war, government or business by deliberative bodies provided discussion by such bodies does not atrophy action. The Germans had the other concept, that of a single and personal source of decision. It did not work successfully in the German war staff, in the German government or, as the records of Albert Speer's testimony show in German war production.